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frends and Problems in the Study of Political Development
J3YJOSEPH L. ARBENA
cwmson University
There are in the world in 1974 almost 250 separate geographical
entities, either countries or territories. Of these, the United Nations has
classified 200, or roughly 80%,underdeveloped or developing. 1 Although
many of these entities contain fewer than one million people, their combined population is approximately 2.75 billion, or 73%of the world's 3.75
billion people. 2 In a world still shrinking due to advances in communications technology, the presence of so many people living in circumstances which inhibit their human development continues to complicate
the international political, economic, and strategic environment. It also
continues to irritate the moral sensitivities and to stimulate the intellectual curiosities of persons in the more developed regions. Surely the
persistence of underdevelopment is one of the key dynamics in today's
world.
As a result, David Apter and S. S. Mushi could write recently that
"social scientists are agreed that development is now a problem of universal concern," 3 a concern which dates , for several reasons, from the
mid-1940s.4 The post-World War II decolonization movements throughout the Third World brought to power leaders who not only wanted to
serve their new nations, but who were under pressure to legitimize their
rule by bringing benefits to their constituents. Besides, the only pattern
of leadership which these rulers had to follow was the experience of the
older nations-hence , the imitative effort to catch up or develop.
This demonstration effect was enhanced by an acceleration in communications which circulated world-wide a graphic image of material
and institutional progress; millions became aware for the first time of
what they did not have, leading to the oft-labeled revolution of rising
1 Such classifications are, of course, subjective. For a brief summary of several
widely used classifications of developing countries, see Adrian Moyes and Teresa
Hayter, World III. A Handbook on Developing Countries (London, 1964) , p . 2.
For an alternative, Marxist classification, see Pierre Jalee, The Pillage oj the Third
World, trans. Mary Klopper (New York, 1968), p. 5.
2 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Demographic
Yearbook: 1970 (New York, 1971).
3 D. E. Apter and S. S. Mushi, "Political Science," International Social Science
Journal, XXIV ( 1972), 48.
4 According to L. J. Lebret, in Dynamique concrete du developpement (Paris,
1957), p. 38, "the idea of development originates in 1945."
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expectations. 15 Included, moreover, in this demonstration was the idea
increasingly popular in the more developed nations, that science
technology could solve any human problem. Development, there fore
required only the sufficient application of rational planning and tech~
nical know-how. Optimism, needless to say, ran high among leaders in
all three worlds. 6
Helping to spread both the images and the optimism were the
United Nations and a variety of international agencies. These groups
not only worked to alleviate and to overcome the problems of underdevelopment. They also publicized to a universal audience the great
disparities in the world's standards of living. In so doing they both
stimulated the less developed nations to seek a higher standard and
encouraged the conviction that the existing inequities were an issue of
moral concern. The development question, thereby, came to possess
ethical as well as political and economic overtones. 7
Finally, because of the atmosphere of the Cold War, strategic considerations further intensified the universalization process. The Third
World became an ideological battleground for East and West, as each
sought to play on the discontent and aspirations of the underdeve loped
through propaganda campaigns and the promise-not always ful£lledof foreign aid. In the new international game of numbers, the hope was
to place one more country in "our column," or, at least, to prevent one
from going into "theirs." If foreign aid did on occasion spring from
humanitarianism, it was, nonetheless, convenient when humanitarian and
strategic concerns overlapped.
Initially, this interest in development focused mainly on economic
problems, but as it became obvious that development was a more complex form of social change than had originally been thought and as
many Americans, under the pressures of the Cold War, easily confused
economic and political concepts-the infamous Communism-democ racy
dichotomy-the interest quickly broadened to include political and other
considerations.
Given the magnitude of these growing concerns it is not surprising
that there was a parallel publication explosion. Although early theorists

and

5 Anthony R. ObserschaJ.L "Rising Expectations and Political Turmoil," Journal
of Development Studies, 6 (Oct. 1969), 5-22.
6 For typical statements of the belief that development entailed spreading Western values and could be achieved through proper planning and administration, see
Eugene R. Black, The Diplomacy of Economic Development ( Cambridge, 1960) ;
Clark Kerr et. al., Industrialism and Industrial Man (New York, 1964); and W. W.
Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York,
1962).
7 Barbara Ward, The Lopsided World (New York, 1968), presents a highly
moralistic appeal for aid for the underdeveloped areas.
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of social relationships, such as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Joseph
Shumpeter, Max Weber, and Herbert Spencer, speculated about longrange patterns of societal development, social scientists in significant
numbers did not view development as a specific, delimited area of study
until (again) about the end of World War 11.8 Arthur Kemp estimates
that since that time the world's technical economic journals have contained over 15,000 articles devoted in whole or in part to the questions
of economic growth and development. This does not include books, nor
articles in semi-technical and popular periodicals. 9 The extent of writing
on political development and the politics of modernization may not be
so great, but it is surely large and equally overwhelming. 10
Apart from sheer quantity, the bulk of the political science literature of the post-war decades differed from earlier writing on development in several important regards. Sidney Verba has summarized those
trends:
The revolution in comparative politics started with a number
of brave principles: look beyond description to more theoretically
relevant problems; look beyond the single case to the comparison of
many cases; look beyond the formal institutions of governments to
political processes and political functions; and look beyond the
countries of Western Europe to the new nations of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America. 11
It was those principles, emanating from the older and at that time narrower field of comparative politics, which gave rise to the scientific study
of development as a universal phenomenon.
This rejection of the so-called traditional-institutional approach to
comparative politics was, in fact, part of the larger behavioral movement
which challenged the discipline of political science in the 1940s and
1950s, and reached its peak in the early 1960s.12 Although probably misnamed, behavioralism, in its broadest and most general usage, encouraged the application of scientific empiricism rather than intuitive or
8 For an introductory discussion of the concepts of development and progress
in Western thought, see Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History. Aspects of
the Western Theory of. Development (New York, 1969).
9 Arthur Kemp, 'Dimensions of Development: An Iconoclastic View," Modem
Age, 16 ( Fall 1972), 398.
10 Ralph Braibanti, "Comparative Political Analytics Reconsidered," Journal of
Politics, 30 (Feb. 1969)., 25-65.
11 Sidney Verba, 'Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research, World Politics,
XX (Oct. 1967), 111.
12 Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for
a Monument to a Successful Protest," American Political Science Review, LV (Dec.
1961), 763-772; Heinz Eulau , "The Behavioral Movement in Political Science: A
Personal Document," Social Research, 35 ( Spring 1965), 1-29.
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impressionistic techniques, objective rather than subjective perspecti ves
inductive rather than deductive reasoning. Political behavior rep laced
legal forms as the focus of study. Drawing on the methods of other
social sciences, behavioralists began to look at both the role of the individual political actor and the relationship of all actors in the context
of a total system. Ultimately, behavioralism looked to the construction
of theory based on reality rather than on arbitrary standards of normality or morality.
Another quality of the new development literature was that same
optimism which characterized the thinking of politicians and planners.
However, the optimism of the post-war era differed from earlier beliefs
in inevitable progress based on the mechanistic operation of natura l laws.
Disillusioned by the two World Wars and the Great Depression, the orists
and planners alike now made development contingent on the intellige nce
and will of men rather than the inexorable wave of social evolution.
Nevertheless, as Irving Horowitz has pointed out, "the development concept at a significant level is a 20th-century equivalent of the 19th-century
notion of progress. Development is a shared belief that men and nations
not only change but somehow change for the better." 13 In short, the
assumed bases for the optimism were different, but the faith in eventual
success was the same. The clash between this native optimism and claims
to scientific objectivity is obvious.
But, as Gabriel Almond observed in 1969, "a mood of disillusionment appears to be sweeping the field of comparative politics and political development." 14 This disillusionment stems, in part, from the failure of the various programs for development, applied with inconsistent
vigor, to make an impact on rates of world economic and political improvement.15 It also stems from the fact that, at least as regards comparative politics and the study of political development, it has be come
evident in recent years that, despite their many contributions, the pr actitioners of behavioralism have not really achieved the objectives implicit
in their approach . Consequently, during the last five years, especially
since we entered the "second development decade," much of the conventional wisdom on all aspects of development has been subjecte d to
13Irving Louis Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development
Decade," Studies in Comparative International Development, VII (Summer 1972),
184.
14 Gabriel A. Almond, "Determinacy-Choice, Stability-Change: Some Thoughts
on a Contemporary Polemic in Political Theory," Government and Opposition, 5
(Winter 1969-1970), 22.
15Lester B. Pearson, et. al., Partners in Development (New York, 1969). For
a more optimistic assessment of the world economic scene at the end of the 1960s,
see Eugene R. Black, "Development Revisited," Virginia Quarterly Review, 47
(Winter 1971), 1-17, and Paul G. Hoffman, "Development Co-operation: A Fact
of Modem Life," ibid. (Summer 1971), 321-335.
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extensive criticism, modification, and, at times, outright rejection. 16 This
is not to imply that development thinking was devoid of variations prior
to the late 1960s. Rather, it suggests that in the mainstream of political
science such variations were more a matter of degree than of substance. 17
In the first place, despite an emphasis on scientific precision, there
bas occurred, in Geoffrey Roberts' words, "a long-term debasement of
political terminology," producing a "variety of unintegrated vocabularies
of political language" and a "growing inability to communite." 18 Although Roberts may be unduly cynical, it is undeniable that many integral terms and concepts in the field of development have no universally
accepted or scientifically rigorous definition. "Conceptually the critical
notions of capacity and differentiation and specialization are exceptionally vague, if not tautological, in their referents and difficult to operationalize." 19 The same can surely be said of such idealistic forms as
independence, freedom, and democracy, and of more delimited, yet
popular, concepts such as traditionalism, stability, secularization, and
political system. 20 Not surprisingly, there is great inconsistency and imprecision in the use of the concept of development itself. 21
Numerous authors, for example, insist that we apply the word developing, rather than backward or underdeveloped, to the countries of
the Third World, because, they argue, all nations, including the more
advanced, "are, or should be, developing, and no country is fully de1s A. R. Dennon offers a sweeping, though somewhat polemical, denunciation
of development thinking in political science; see "Political Science and Political Development," Science and Society, XXXIII (Summer-Fall 1969), 285-298. A bitter
critique of_ the last half century of social science literature, including the study of
development, is found in Stanisfav Andreski, Social Sciences as Sorcery ( London,
1972). For Andreski's own useful contribution to development thought, see Parasitism and Subversion. The Case of Latin America (New York, 1966).
17 A. E. Keir Nash, "Pollution, Population, and the Cowboy Economy," Journal
of Comparative Administration, 2 (May 1970), 109-128. For attempts to create
taxonomies of post-war approaches to the study of political development, see Robert
A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of Political Development," World Politics,
XVII (Oct. 1964), 108-120; Chong-Do Hah and Jeanne Schneider, "A Critique of
Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization," Social Research, 35
(Spring 1968), 130-158; David E. Apter and Charles Andrain, "Comparative Government: Developing New Nations," Journal of Politics, 30 (May 1968), 372-416;
Apter and Mushi, "Political Science."
18 Geoffrey K. Roberts, "Com~arative Politics Today," Government and Opposition, 7 ( Winter 1972 ),, 49, and 'To Lift the Curse from Babel: The Need for a
Language of Politics," it1id. (Spring 1972), 252.
19 John Walton, "Political Development and Economic Development: A Regional Assessment of Contemporary Theories," Studies in Comparative International
Development, VII (Spring 1972), 58.
20 For a penetrating critique of the concept of political systems, see S. E. Finer,
"Almond's Concept of 'The Political System': A Textual Critique," Government and
Opposition, 5 ( Winter 1969-1970), 3-21.
21 In a widely-cited article, Lucian W. Pye analyzes ten frequently used definitions of political development; see "The Concept of Political Development," The
Annals, 358 (March 1965), 1-13.
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veloped," inasmuch as development is an infinite open-en ded process.22
Although this view is preferable to the older advanced-bac kward dich.
otomy, it still assumes a process of linear movement and gives too little
attention to the fact that all nations are not in the process of developing
as, in recent years , some appear to be at best stagnating ( e.g., Colomb~
and Saudi Arabia), while others appear to be in fact regre ssing ( e.g.
Uruguay and Nigeria). 23 Also, a few writers have of late introduced th;
term overdeveloped to describe nations whose economies abuse their
environments, whose institutions dehumanize their members, and whose
bureaucracies no longer serve their clients. 24 Of course, as Charles Tay.
lor reminds us, not all significant political changes need be considered
either progress or regression. 25 In other words, there is no agree ment as
to what developmen t-be it politica l, economic, social, or cultur al-really
is and who is, or is not, actually developed. In fact , there is now no
agreement among social scientists as to the possibility or even desirability of development, at least not on the terms in which development
has been most generally perceived .26
Reflective of this confusion has been the inability to distinguish
between politica l development as a distinct process and the development
of other sectors of the social system. Heli o Jaguaribe, for example, maintains that "development is a tota l social process, and only for methodological convenience or in a partial sense can one speak of economic,
politica l, cultural, and social development." By contras t, Taylor insists
that "the first order of business in political development studie s is to
isolate and give substance to the separate dimensions in political terms."27
22 Pearson, et. al., Partners in Development, p. ix.
2s The concept of regression is discussed by S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of
Modernization ," Economic Development and Cultural Change, XIl (July 1964) ,
345-367, and Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay,"
World Politics" XVII (April 1965), 386-430.
24
ash 'Pollution, Population, and the Cowboy Economy ."
25 Charies Lewis Taylor, "Indicators of Political Development," Journal of Development Studies, 8 (April 1972), 108.
26 For a caustic comment on the confusion in use of development and related
terms, see Kemp, "Dimensions of Development: An Iconoclastic View," 399. For
expressions of doubts about the future of development resulting from environme ntal
and ethic al considerations, see Herman E. Daly, "Trends in Economic Interpre tations in Latin America: The Shifting Balance among Neo-Classical, Neo-Marxist,
and Neo-Malthusian Views," SECOLAS Annals, II (March 1971), 83-96; Warre n
Dean, "Economic Developm ent and Environmental Deterioration ," Studies in Comparative Development, VII (Fall 1972), 278-287; Edward J. Woodhouse, "Revisionipg the Future of the Third World: An Ecological Perspective on Developme nt,"
World Politics, XXV (Oct. 1972) , 1-33.
27 Jaguaribe , Economic and Political Dev elopment. A Theoretical Approach &
a Brazilian Case Study ( Cambridg e, 1968) , p. 4; Taylor, "Indicators of Political
Development," 108. Support for Taylor is found in J. P. Nettl and Karl von Vorys,
"Th e Politics of Developm ent," Commentary, 46 (July 1968) , 59. Walton summarizes the conflicting interpretations of the relationship of economic and political development; see, "Political Development and Economic Development," 39-43.
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Because there is no consensus on an objective definition of political
development, the assignment of developed, developing, or underdeveloped ( sometimes modem, transitional, or traditional) status to a political
system is, in truth, a function of individual , subjective preferences. Yet,
there is a surprising consistency in the classification schemes employed
by scholars using different working definitions, in that the same countries appear repeatedly in the same relative positions regardless of the
tax:onomic criteria. These classifications, in turn, correspond quite highly
to standard categories of economic development. Therefore, it seems fair
to conclude that students of political development are not studying political development as an independent phenomenon, but rather the politics of nation-states that are relatively more or less economically and
technologically developed or modem. The relationship is probably symbiotic rather than causal, though this remains unproven. Either way, the
principal justification for a separate study of political development apparently lies in the unique relationship of the political process to the
broader milieu of underdevelopment. Even if they consider political development to be a distinct and separate process, most students of the
subject work from the assumption that political development is a "historically identifiable set of political changes associated with the onset of
industrialization in any given society" and that "some pattern of political
modernization ... must inevitably accompany the process of social and
economic modernization." 28
Related to the lack of consensus on the meaning of development has
been the post-war predeliction to formulate universal models of development based on European and North Atlantic experiences and values. 29
Again, despite the commitment to culture-free objectivity, social scientists internationally have worked from methodological and theoretical
assumptions adopted often uncritically from the environment of the First
and Second Worlds. The result has been a "problem of malanalysis based
on general propositions without proper linkage with concrete data, of
faulty generalizations, of inadequate mastery of data, of selecting the
wrong issues, [and] of redundant repetition of accepted propositions." 30
28 Roger W. Benjamin, et. al. Patterns of Political Development (New York,
1972), p. 11; Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein, Issues in Comparative Politics
(New York, 1971), p. 25. Marion J. Levy, Jr., begins with the assumption that "the
measure of modernization [is] the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power."
For a provocative and entertaining examination. of the comprehensive implications of
the modernization process, see his Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors (New
York, 1972). ( The quote is from p. 3n.)
29 For examples, see Rostow, Th e Stages of Economic Growth, and A. F. K.
Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York, 1967). More recently,
Rostow attempted unsuccessfully to fuse the stage-theory approaches to political and
economic development; see, Politics and the Stages of Growth ( Cambridge , 1971).
so Syed Hussein Alatas, "The Captive Mind in Development Studies," International Social Science Journal, XXIV ( 1972), 9-25.
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Octavio Paz, Mexican essayist and critic, speaks for many in the less
developed areas, when he laments that his country's development model
"fails to correspond to our true historical, psychic, and cultural reality
and is instead a mere copy ( and a degraded copy) of the orth Amen.
can archtype. Again: we have not been able to create viable models of
development, models that correspond to what we are." 31 He also cor.
rectly describes a rising trend among social scientists in the nominally
more developed areas when he observes that "not only capitalist development but also the very notion of development has come under fire. ...
In the East as in the West, the criticism of society that is taking shape is
leading to a search for viable models of development different from those
predominate today." 32 We must, Paz concludes, reject an approach "with
more of slavish thoughtlessness in it than of scientific rigor." 83
This should not be taken to mean that the prior experiences of older
societies are of no relation to the development of newer ones . Talcott
Parsons and the structural-functionalists, for example, have cogently argued the validity of comparing both common systemic needs and some
broad developmental patterns in all or most modernizing societies. 84 The
concern is that "even if we do discover a configuration we can all 'industria l man,' or 'modem man,' the existence of such a con.figuration should
not be permitted to obscure the important cross-cultural variati ons which
exist simultaneously with the similarities." As F. Stirton Weave r has
shown, through an examination of the Chilean case, "the change s in
industrial arts and organization in the last two hundred years have so
radically altered the social impact of industrialization that the application of theories generalizing from earlier successful industria lization
must be used with extreme caution in analyzing economic chang e in
s1 Octavio Paz, The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid, trans. Lysander
Kemp (New York, 1972), p. 73. Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian priest, boasts that
"the poor countries are not interested in modeling themselves after the rich"; see,
A Theology of Liberation, trans. Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson (Mary knoll,
New York, 1973), p. 22. Carlos Fuentes, another Mexican, contends that "we are
different from you. Our problems are not your problems. We have to make decisions and walk on roads different from those you believe to be universally valid";
see, "The Argument of Latin America: Words for the North Americans," Monthly
Review (Jan. 1963), 502.
32 Paz, The Other Mexico, pp. 143-144; Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of
Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization," 130-158.
38 Paz, The Other Mexico, p. 72.
8 4 Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological
Review, 29 (June 1964), 339-357, and Mark A. Tessler, ''The Application of West·
em Theories and Measures of Political Participation to a Single-Party North African
State," Comparative Political Studies, 5 (July 1972), 175-191; Ian Weinberg, "The
Problem of the Convergence of Industrial Societies: A Critical Look at the State of
a Theory," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 11 (Jan. 1969), 1-15.
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contemporary poor countries." 35 This caveat can surely be extended to
models of political development as well.
Disagreement also plagues the search for the analytical level on
which meaningful generalizations can be constructed. This failure to recognize the most appropriate level is, according to Hah and Schneider,
"the main methodological impediment to the progress of development
studies." 36 If social scientists at one time anticipated the construction
of explanatory and predictive models of development applicable to all
nations and peoples, their efforts in that direction have been markedly
unsuccessful: 87 "the general theoretical works float well above reality,
and they often are so abstract as to suggest no clear problem focus." 38
To counter this fault some theoreticians are suggesting an intermediate, or middle-level, approach based on segments of systems and subsets of nations. 89 The problem then becomes one of selecting criteria for
grouping. Lawrence S. Graham, contemplating the role of bureaucracies
in the development process, proposes "the identification of distinct culture areas, beyond the confines of the individual states, where distinct
perceptions and expectations . . . point to shared norms and values at
the supranational level." 40 Applying such a standard, however, is harder
than it sounds. Douglas Chalmers, for example, asserts the universality
of an identifiable type of sociopolitical structure within the Latin American area and its distinctiveness compared with other parts of the world. 41
85 C. Milton Coughenour and John B. Stephenson, "Measures of Individual
Modernity: Review and Commentary," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, XIII (June 1972), 98; F. Stirton Weaver, "Growth Theory and Chile: The
Problem of Generalizing from Historical Example," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, XII (Jan. 1970), 55-61. Leopoldo Zea, Mexican philoso_pher,
suggests that the best model for the new nations of Africa and Asia might be found
in the Latin American experience; see, Latin America and the World (Norman,
1969).
86 Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development
and Modernization," 158.
87 Roberts, "Comparative Politics Today," 55.
38 Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," 112.
39 Robert Burrowes, "Theory Si, Data Nol A Decade of Cross-National Political
Research," W orl.d Politics, XXV ( Oct. 1972), 143. Additional comments on the need
for middle-level conceptualization is found in Joseph LaPalombara, "Macrotheories
and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A Widening Chasm," Comparative
Politics, 1 ( Oct. 1968), 52-78; Roy C. Macridis, "Comparative Politics and the Study
of Government: The Sear~h for Focus," ibid., 79-90; Braibanti, "Comparative Political Analytics Reconsidered."
4 0 Lawrence S. Graham, "Projections for Future Research," Journal of Comparative Administration, 4 ( Aug. 1972), 258.
41 Douglas Chalmers, "Parties and Society in Latin America," Studies in Comparative International Development, VII (Summer 1972), 102-128. Chalmers has
received support from Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the study of
Political Change in lberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," World Politics,
tory, 11 (June 1969), 342-354.
XXV (Jan. 1973), 206-235, and Edward J. Williams, "Comparative Political Development: Latin America and Afro-Asia," Comparative Studies in Society and His-
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In contrast, Charles Arnade and Eugene Genovese, both historians, con.
tend that all or part of Latin America should be linked on a highe r level
of analysis with other regions in the Third World. 42 Consequen tly, stu.
dents of political development, whatever their regional specialty, can
share in Henry Bienen's lament that "we have not been able to say what
political development in Africa means or to decide whether or not
we ought to mean something by 'political development' which is sui
generis." 43
If there is now a movement to postpone the search for universal
theories, there is at the same time in some quaiters, as the above comment by Graham implies, a desire to get away from the nation-sta te, in
its comprehensive, systemic sense, as the primary unit of analysis . This
is true, in part, because an emphasis on whole sytems makes meaning ful
comparison very difficult; it also underscores the fact that many na tions
are not homogeneous or highly integrated. Recognizing, therefore, the
great disparities in wealth, values, and behavior among persons and regions within individual countries, it seems useful to examine the development role of a variety of environmental factors ( e.g., urbaniza tion
industrialization, population, pollution and resource depletion) and so~
cial institutions ( e.g., businesses, bureaucracies, professional and occupational groups) which either cut across national lines or exist within
most countries and can be analyzed comparatively. 44 To achieve this,
for example, John Walton has employed a "'standardized case comparison' procedure" to study subnational regions simultaneously within and
across national boundaries. 45 At any rate, an emphasis on ecological vari42 Charles W. Arnade, "Recent Latin America and Sub-Sahara Africa: A Comparison," SECOLAS Annals, III (1972), 37-43; Eugene D. Genovese, "The Comparative Focus in Latin America History," Journal of Inter-American and Wo rld
Affairs, XII (July 1970), 317-327. Bruce M. Russett has discussed some quanti tative
approaches to defining world regions; see, "Delineating International Regions," pp.
317-353 in Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, ed. J. David
Singer (New York, 1968). This disagreement is a reflection of the larger debate
over the proper place of Latin American studies in the field of comparative politics;
see, Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," pp .
168-207 in Social Science Research on Latin America, ed. Charles Wagley ( New
York, 1964); John D. Martz, "The Place of Latin America in the Study of Comparative Politics," Journal of Politics, 28 (Feb. 1966), 57-80; Martz, "Political Science and Latin American Studies: A Discipline in Search of a Region,'' Latin
American Research Review, VI ( Spring 1971), 73-99; Alfred Stepan, "Political Development Theory: The Latin American Experience,'' Journal of International Affairs,
XX ( 1966), 223-234; Philippe C. Schmitter, "New Strategies for the Comparati ve
Analysis of Latin American Politics," Latin American Research Review, IV ( Summer 1969), 83-110.
43 Henry Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" World
Politics, XX (Oct. 1967), 128-141.
44 Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development Decade."
45 Walton , "Political Development and Economic Development." See also, Ben•
jamin, et. al., Patterns of Political Development, and Audrey C. Smock, Comparative Politics: A Reader in Institutionaliwtion and Mobilization ( Boston, 1973) .
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ables-including the world physical and biological environment-and
international linkages is one of the important innovations in recent comparative studies. 48
One theoretical outgrowth of these perspectives is the concept of
structured underdevelopment which has gained considerable popularity
in recent years especially among neo-Marxist economists and sociologists.
,According to this view, underdevelopment, rather than being a given or
natural state from which all societies evolve, is a product of the expansion of the North Atlantic capitalist system and the establishment of a
dependent relationship between the peripheral and metropolitan areas.
While this dependency may be linked at one point to a colonial empire,
it does not necessarily end with the demise of official colonialism. Underdevelopment, in other words, derives from the presence, not absence, of
capitalism and other so-called modem institutions and values. In the
political realm, underdevelopment is maintained by an alliance between
those international forces and local elites which benefit from the status
quo.47
If this interpretation has any value, we are forced in turn to reevaluate the dual society thesis which pictures transitional societies as
having a modem-urban sector and a traditional-rural sector, the latter
resisting the spread of the former and thereby inhibiting development,
which is tautologically defined as the decline of traditionalism . Recent
investigations not only refute the basis of this dualism, but question the
whole concept of traditionalism as the reverse of development. The corollary theories of disruptive migrants and radical marginals also appear
to lack empirical substance. 48
411James Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics. Essays on the Convergence of National
and International Systems ( New York, 1969); Robert B. Stauffer, "Great-Power
Constraints on Political Development,'' Studies in Comparative International Development, VI (1970-71), 231-251; Richard Lee Clinton , "Portents for Politics in Latin
American Population Expansion," SECOLAS Annals, III (March 1972), 70-83. Also
see the last three articles cited in Note 26 above.
47Osvaldo Sunkel, "National Development Policy and External Dependence in
Latin America," Journal of Development Studies, 6 (Oct. 1969), 23-48; Irving Louis
Horowitz, "The Norm of Illegitimacy: Toward a General Theory of Latin American
Political Development," Soundings, LI ( Spring 1968), 8-32; Henry Bernstein, "Moderrrization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development," Journal of Development Studies, 7 (Jan. 1971), 141-160; Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial
Heritage of Latin America. Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective (New
York, 1970); John D. Esseks, "Economic Dependence and Political Development in
New States of Africa," Journal of Politics, 331 ( Nov. 1971), 1052-1075; Immanuel
Wallerstein, "Three Paths of National Development in Sixteenth-Century Europe,"
Studies in Comparative International Development, VII (Summer 1972), 95-101;
Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America ( New
York, 1967); Celso Furtado, Development and Underdevelopment (Berkeley, 1964).
48 H. W. Singer, "Dualism Revisited: A New Approach to the Problems of the
Dual Society in Developing Countries," Journal of Development Studies, 1 ( Oct.
1970), 60-75; Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Erroneous Thesis About Latin America,"
pp. 102-117 in Horowitz, et. al., eds., Lattn American Radicalism (New York, 1969);
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If the research of the post-war decades has not often been truly
comparative, neither has it been truly developmental. What we have, in
many cases, is actually comparative statics, the enumeration of successive stages and a contrasting of characteristics of each stage. How a
system moves from one stage to another has been too rarely considered.49
Even Gabriel Almond recently conceded the failure of his earlier Writings to treat this problem and formulated his own model of "developmental episodes" to facilitate explanation of systemic change .50 Nevertheless, it will surely be a long time before we can determine if change
is more likely to come dialectically, "in spurts, with definite ascertai nable
conditions," possibly accompanied by violence, 51 or through processes in
which conflict, even where it exists, is incidental, and in which the central pattern is cumulative, evolutionary, and continuous. 52
A partial explanation of these shortcomings in political development studies has been the frequent inability to transcend traditiona l disciplinary baniers-"interdisciplinarity
is in the air, though it is more
often preached than practiced." 53 For example, in a subject area which
is by its nature implicitly historical, it is tragic that "political scientists
seem to believe that history has no place in their discipline ." 54 Althou gh
that assessment may be less true today than it was five years ago, students of development still approach the past with less precision th an
they supposedly treat the present. 55 The absence of any explicit conception of time eliminates the possibility of constructing those developme nMitchell A. Seligson, "The 'Dual Society' Thesis in Latin America: A Reexamination
of the Costa Rican Case," Social Forces, 51 (Sept. 1972), 91-98; S. N. Eisens tadt,
"Some Observations on the Dynamics of Traditions," Comparative Studies in Society
and History, 11 ( Oct. 1969), 451-475; Heinz Bechert, et. al., "Post-Traditio nal
Societies," Daedalus, 102 (Winter 1973); Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization Without
Breakdown: A Case Study," pp. 424-437 in Dwight B. Heath and Richard N.
Adams, eds., Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America (New York,
1965); Joan M. Nelson, Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing
Societies ( Cambridge, 1969).
49Burrowes, "Theory Si, Data Nol" 125; Rudolf Rezsohazy, "The Concept of
Social Time: Its Role in Development," International Social Science Journal, XXIV
(1972), 26-36.
50 Almond, "Determinacy-Choice , Stability-Change," 22-40 .
5 1 Robert Nisbet, "The Military Community," Virginia Quarterly Review, 49
(Winter 1973), 16; Richard 0. Nahrendorf, "Violence and Social Change," Sociology and Social Research, 56 ( Oct. 1971), 5-18.
r;2 Kenneth E. Boulding, A Primer on Social Dynamics: History as Dialectics
and Development (New York, 1970).
53 lgnacy Sachs, "The Logic of Development," International Social Science
Journal, XXIV (1972), 37.
54 Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies on Political Developme nt
and Modernization," 158.
55 Trowbridge H. Ford, "Towards a Better Relation between History and Political Science," Government and Opposition, 1 ( Spring 1972), 207-228.
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tal generalizations discussed in the previous paragraph. 56 This failure to
achieve a comprehensive historical perspective also explains the confusion of Western development experiences with those of the present Third
World.
History is not the only discipline from which, until recently, political
scientists too often neglected to draw. If our earlier generalization is
correct-that behavioralism provoked a dual interest in individual political actors and collective political systems-then the bulk of that interest, at least in the Third World, has focused on the systemic rather
than the individual level. 57 This is basically true whether the focus has
been national, regional, or universal.
Although commendable advances have recently characterized the
application of psychological and sociological insights to problems of
political development, 58 many scholars continue to pay only lip service
to the axiom that "it is the actors, rather than the institutions or the systems, that make the choices." 59 Institutions, systems, and their environments certainly set limits on alternatives and the methods of implementation, but that does not negate the importance of understanding how
values and knowledge are acquired nor how choices are made. 60
In sum, the parochialism of the practitioners of the various disciplines concerned with development has deprived scholars and planners
alike of the balanced and integrated perspective that they need to properly do their jobs. 61
Overarching all of these inter-related criticisms of postwar development literature is the feeling that the concern of development studies
56 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Political Development: Time Sequence and Rates of
Change," World Politics, XX ( April 1968), 495. Three important studies which do
attempt to relate long-range historical patterns to theories of political development
are C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History
(New York, 1966); S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political Systems of Empires (New York,
1963); Barrington Moore, Jr., The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World (London, 1967). For a recent discussion of the difficulty involved in trying to establish sequential patterns in
the development process, see Leonard Binder, et. al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development ( Princeton, 1971).
57 Horowitz, "Research Priorities for the Second Development Decade."
58 Apter and Mushi, "Political Science," 65-67; Coughenour and Stephenson,
"Measures of Individual Modernity: Review and Commentary."
59 Hah and Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies on Political Development and Modernization," 145; Alatas, "The Captive Mind in Development Studies."
oo A recent book by Taketsugu Tsurutani places welcome emphasis on political
leadership as a crucial element in national development. However, the author probably carries his argument too far when he contends that any political leader is
theoretically capable of bending any environmental circumstances to his own advantage; see, The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transitional Societies (New York, 1973).
6 1 George C. Lodge, The Case for the Generalist in Rural Development (Washington, 1969).
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"cannot be simply with description, however complex," 62 but should
give greater attention to human needs and values and be more directly
related to feasible development planning for the actual achieve ment of
a better life for the people still living in an underdeveloped state.63
True, behavioral techniques have always carried with them the capacity
to promote normative judgments and to encourage the forma tion of human values. 64 There emerges the impression, however, that stu dents of
political development, in their devotion to scientific objectivity, have not
been aware of the normative assumptions which underlie their own
work nor willing to admit that their research, if only through the topics
studied and methods employed, communicates certain value judgme nts.
Undoubtedly, the prevalence of Western norms in post-war models
designed for Third World development is not only a reflection of ethnocentrism but also an attempt, subconscious or not, to keep things quiet'to keep the restless natives in their places'-for the protection of (m ost.
often) American economic and security interests. 65 Hence, the emphasis
on such concepts as stability and equilibrium, the preference for stagnation over violence, the acceptance of military regimes as reform agents,
and, when the early post-war optimism went unfulfilled, a tenden cy to
blame this on the institutions, mentalities, values, and supposed incapabilities of the Third World peoples and nations themselves rather than
on the historic relationship between these nations and the developed
areas of the world. 66
62 Graeme C. Moodie and Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, "Means and Ends of Political Analysis," Government and Opposition, 5 ( Summer 1970), 286.
63Charles W. Anderson, "Comparative Policy Analysis: The Design of Measures," Comparative Politics, 4 (Oct. 1971), 117-131. Kalman Silvert notes that in
Latin America the "creation of ideology" is a commonly accepted goal among social scentists; see, "Social Science Research in Latin America," Latinamericanist
(University of Florida), 8 (Dec. 20, 1972), 4.
64 Fred Kort, "The Multiple Dilemma of Political Science," Modern Age, 16
(Winter 1972), 15-24.
65 Western social scientists have dominated development studies since their beginning; within the Western world, the United States has produced the majority of
scholars in the field. See, Alatas, "The Captive Mind in Development Studies."
66 Lucien W. Pye, for example, refers to Third World insurgents as "enemies
of freedom . . . who would destroy the prospects of democratic development and
establish the rule of tyrants." See, Aspects of Political Development (Boston , 1966),
pp. 127, 152. Other examples of these patterns are found in Ernest W. Lefever,
Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa (Washington, 1970),
and Nettl and von Vorys, "The Politics of Development." Criticisms of these tendencies are found in Bernard P. Kiernan The United States, Communism, and the
Emergent World ( Bloomington, 1973); Charles C. Moskos and Wendell Bell,
"Emerging Nations and Ideologies of American Social Scientists," The American
Sociologist, 2 ( May 1967), 67-72; Robert I. Rhodes, "The Disguised Conservatism
in Evolutionary Development Theory ," Science and Society, 32 (Fall 1968), 383412; Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry Into the Poverty of Nations, 3 vols.
( New York, 1968). For a penetrating discussion of the ethical implications of the
relationship between social science research and policy formation, see Irving Louis
Horowitz, ed., The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot (Cambridge, 1967).
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If we assume that planners and "political leaders can be active
agents in the process of making change," 67 then the research and theories from which they draw will lead to decisions of considerable human importance: "development implies goals and the positing of goals
requires values." 68 Research, in other words, is not carried out in a
vacuum. As a result more writers are saying, with Mark Tessler, that
''no theoretical discussion is worthwhile 'unless it provides, in addition
to tentative explanations, realistic and practical answers to the question
-what should be done next?' The construction of general theory should
be only one of the preoccupations of the social scientist." 69 The scholar
should continue to seek the ideal of scientific objectivity, but must likewise recognize his own assumptions and come to grips \.vith the practical
consequences of his work. 70
This abbreviated survey of recent trends in development studies
probably justifies Almond's reference to a mood of disillusionment. 71
Yet it remains a fact that, whatever development is, many people want
it, for themselves or for others, and are often willing to go to great
lengths to get it. Past failures to achieve precision in the study of development or progr ess in the attainment of development should not dissuade us from further attempts at both, even though we have no guarantee of success. Development remains an exciting field of intellectual
inquiry and a pressing concern of international reality.
Bienen, "What Does Political Development Mean in Africa?" 135.
Taylor, "Indicators of Political Development," 105.
Tessler, "The Application of Western Theories and Measures of Political
' Participation to a Single-Party North African State," 187. For a provocative discussion of the connection between ethics and development, see Denis Goulet, The
Cruel Choice. A New Concept in the Theory of Development (New York, 1971).
70 Again, this trend in the fields of comparative and development studies is part
of a larger movement in the discipline of political science; see, David Easton , "The
New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science Review, LXIII
( Dec. 1969), 1051-1061, and the various essays in George J. Graham , Jr., and
George W. Carey, eds., The Post-Behavioral Era: Perspective on Political Science
(New York, 1972).
71 For a useful bibliography emphasizing comparative theory and methodology ,
see Susan Bettelheim Garfin, comp., "Comparative Studies: A Selective Annotated
Bibliography," pp. 423-467 in Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on Trenda
and Applications, ed. Ivan Vallier (Berkeley, 1971).
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